Abstract-Using data of listed firms on Hochiminh Stock
INTRODUCTION
Corporate disclosure is very necessary and important for investors on the financial market. The more corporate disclosureis provided to the market, the less asymmetric information is between firmsand investors, and also between firms and other agents (government agencies, banks, business partners).This help to reduces agency problem. Corporate disclosure hence is an important factor that directly influences the decision making of market participants who mainly obtain information through firm'sfinancial statements. The obtaining and screening of corporate information is even more necessary for investors in an emerging stock market like Vietnam. However, the disclosure degreevaries among firms and its determinants havestill been an open question for both academics and practioners. Many empirical studies on the determinants ofcorporate disclosurein financial statementshave been implemented for countries around the world (e.g., Patton (2014) . Nevertheless, this study is different from the previous ones in a number of aspects. Firstly, in this study, the effect of some factors that are not considered bythe other research is investigated (e.g.,fixed assets, sectors, corporate governance variables such as the size and composition of director board, management structure and board of supervisors). In addition, the sample in this study has a slightly larger number of observations than previous ones, which shows a better representation for Vietnamese listed firms. The remainder of this study is structured as follows. In section 2, empirical studies on the issue are reviewed, while the methodology is presented in section 3. Section 4 shows empirical results of the study. Finally, conclusions and policy recommendations are shown in section 5. 1 Then the corporate disclosure index, measuring the corporate disclosure degree,is calculated by the ratio of number of disclosed items to the maximum number of disclosure items (e.g., Barako (2007)). 1 The list of items is available upon request. Total 120
Corporate disclosure indexreads
in which:Ij is disclosure of firm j (0≤Ij≤1); nj shows the maximum number of disclosed items of firm j (nj ≤ 120); Xij = 1 if item ioccurs and is released by firm, Xij = 0 if the item i occurs but is unreleased by firm, Xij is not counted if item i does not occur; Xijcomprises of both obligatory and disclosed items. All these items (Xij) are equally weighed summedin calculating corporate disclosure index Ijto avoid biases in assigning weights to items due to subjective assessments.
Definition of all independent variables:
Based on the literature, this study investigates a number offactors which can be classified into two groups: corporate operating characteristics and corporate governance characteristics, (see, e. 
.3 Estimation method
The regression specification is estimated using OLS method. In addition, the tests to check for reliability of the regression resultsare also performed such as multicollinearity (variance inflation factor (VIF)),heteroschedasticity (White test) and autocorrelation (Lagrange (LM)).
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Correlation matrix between variables and summary statistics of variables
The correlation matrix between variables is presented in table 2, while table 3 shows the summary statistics of all variables. As can be seen from Table 2 , the correlation between variables is fairly small (almost less than 0.4), therefore the possible effects of multi-collinearity in OLS regressions are negligible. Yet, a statistical check via VIF test is sobering. 
Findings
The regression results are presented in table 4. The value of VIF for all independent variables is much smaller than 10 (i.e. even smaller than 2), confirming that multicollinearity is not problematic. Moreover, Lagrange (LM) test cannot reject the null hypothesis that no autocorrelation in the error terms of the model (p-value = 0.5432). Likewise, White test also shows the absence of heteroschedasticity in the model (p-value = 0.6565).
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From table 4, it can be seen that the coefficient of SIZE, DEBT, AUDIT and SUPERV is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. However, the coefficient of STATE, BOARDCOMP and DUALITY is statistically negatively at the significance level of 10%, except for STATE at the 5% level of significance. These findings can be further discussed as follows. Firstly, regression results show that corporate size (SIZE) has a positive effect on its disclosure, implying that the higher the sales, the more information firm discloses in the financial statements. This is consistent with most previous empirical studies, such as Raffournier, 1995; Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Phuong and Phuong, 2014, ...), and also in accordance with the agency theory and signaling theory. In fact, an increase in sales can be considered as a positive message about its businessesthat firm wants to send to shareholders and other outsiders. This is especially true for the real situations in Vietnam over the studied period, where the Vietnamese economy has been facing severe difficulties, and many firms have been dissolved and bankrupted. Given these circumstances, more good information (e.g., sales increases) is needed to disclose in attempts to increase the confidence of investors and credit institutions. ://dx.doi.org/10.24001/ijaems.3.5.11 ISSN: 2454-1311
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As for debt ratio (DEBT), the results show that firmwitha higher financial leverage tends to disclose more information, since as firm utilizes more debt the executives voluntarily disclose more information to increase its position to creditors, as well as to meet the information requirements by creditors. This is applicable with the current context of Vietnam, in which the use of excessive leverage by many firms have leaded to higher risk of insolvency and bankruptcies. Hence, the corporate disclosurehas become a way to show firm's trust worthy to creditors. This result is in line withsome others, e.g., Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Barako, 2007, and is also consistent with the signaling theory.For auditing firm (AUDIT), it is obvious that firm audited by one of the Big4-auditorshas a higher corporate disclosure degree than the others.This shows a clear distinction between the quality of a Big4-auditor and that of other auditors from the perspectives of market participants in the country. As audited by a member of Big4-auditors, firm seems to bemore confident and ready to publish a greater amount of detailed information to outsiders. This finding is supported by previous research, (e.g., Patton indicating that firm with a higher proportion of nonexecutive members to total number of director board tends to have a higher corporate disclosure degree. This is counter evidence against the agency theory, proposing that members of director board should not take any executive role in the firm. Nevertheless, this opposite effect (but is in line with Barako (2007)), may be explained by the fact that a high proportion of nonexecutive board member in director board may imply a high number of managing executive members from outside the firm. In an emerging market like Vietnam, these outside executives tend to limit the corporate disclosure as a way to protect firm's businesses from its competitors, which helps them to secure their positions in the firm. As expected, the findings from dual role of director board's chairperson (DUALITY) point out that if a company has a concurrent duty between chairperson and general director, the corporate disclosure degreeis reduced. In fact, as argued by the agency theory this dual role can easily lead to power concentration, resulting in possible manipulations of corporate financial activities, as well as restrictions on information disclosure by firms. The coefficient of all other independent variables including QRATIO, PROFIT, FASSETS, LTIME, SECTOR, FOREIGN and BOARDSIZEis not statistically significant at the traditional significance levels. Therefore, the statistical evidence about the influences of these factors on the corporate disclosure cannot be found in this study.
V.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Due to the great importance of corporate disclosure on the financial statements, many empirical studies have been implemented for countries around the world. This study investigates the determinants of corporate disclosure in Vietnamese listed firms. Several findings from the study can be summarized. Regression results show that as predicted by the literature firm size, the use of financial leverage and the presence of supervision board have a positive effect on the corporate disclosure degree. Moreover, firm audited by a member of Big4 group tends to disclose more information than the others. However, contradicting to the literature, those factors comprising of state ownership and the proportion of non-executive members in director board show a negative effect on corporate disclosure.This counterevidence can be explained by real situations in Vietnam. Finally, thisstudy also supports the literature with the finding that firm with the concurrent role between chair of director board and managing director disclose less information than the others.
